DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT-1976
In 1976, the tenth year since its enactment, the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) I was the subject of judicial interpretation reflecting both its
youth and its maturity.' Several of the statute's provisions received judicial
attention for the first time; one was significantly amended. Yet, in many
instances, cases went beyond a simple construction of the statute to an
attempt to forge a place in the federal administrative structure for the
FOIA's policy favoring disclosure of government information. This effort
often conflicted with existing demands, such as discovery procedures, the
need for confidentiality, and general workload pressures, and these conflicts
required that compromises be struck. In some cases, a consensus has been
reached; in others, division remains.
The issues with which the courts dealt concerned both the Act's
4
affirmative disclosure provisions 3 and its exemptions from disclosure.
First, the courts addressed the question of whether there are justifications for
agency delay in the release of information required to be disclosed under the
Act. Also receiving judicial attention were three of the statute's exemptions,
relating to the protection of private personal files, 5 personnel rules 6 and
investigatory records. 7 Another exemption, covering information exempted
from disclosure by other statutes, 8 was amended by Congress. The courts
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considered whether there might be limitations on their equitable power to
enjoin agency proceedings. Finally, the courts continued the development of
a policy regarding the attempted use of the FOIA to block disclosure of
information. This Note will describe these developments and assess their
probable impact on the future application of the FOIA.
I.

DELAYS IN DIscLosuRE

As a means of promoting the FOIA's basic objective of "fuller and
faster release of information," 9 the 1974 amendments provided for the
"prompt" disclosure of records by agencies1 ° and established specific time
periods within which agencies must respond to requests for records.1 The
justification for imposing these requirements, as seen by the House committee considering the amendments, was that "information is often useful only
if it is timely. Thus, excessive delay by the agency in its response is often
tantamount to denial." 1 2 The speed of agencies in fulfilling the requirements
of the FOIA came to the fore as an issue in 1976. Courts were faced with
two specific questions: first, whether the strict time requirements for responding to requests could be extended if an agency found it impossible to
meet them due to workload pressures, and second, whether an agency could
delay the release of non-exempt materials for policy reasons.
A.

Workload Delays

The FOIA requires any agency which receives a request for information pursuant to the Act to determine within ten working days whether it will
comply.13 It must immediately notify the person making the request of its
14
decision and, if the request is refused, notify him of his right to appeal.
Appeals must be acted upon within twenty working days.15 President Ford
objected to these time restraints because of their inflexibility. 16 He proposed
9. H.R. REP. No. 876, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974).
10. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1976) (originally enacted as Act of Nov. 21,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561-65).
11. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(A) (West Supp. 1976).

12. H.R. REP. No. 876, supra note 9, at 6.
13. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1976).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. The amendments eventually were passed over President Ford's veto by a vote of 371 to
31 (32 not voting) in the House of Representatives, 120 CoNG. REC. H10,875 (daily ed. Nov. 20,
1974), and 65 to 27 (8 not voting) in the Senate, 120 CONG. REc. S19,823 (daily ed. Nov. 21,
1974).
In a letter to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, chairman of the Senate conferees considering the

FOIA amendments, President Ford stated:
I

. .

.believe that the time limits for agency action'are unnecessarily restrictive in

that they fail to recognize valid examples of where providing flexibility in several
specific instances would permit more carefully considered decisions in special cases
without compromising the principle of timely implementation of the Act.
120 CONG. REC. S17,829 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1974).
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two exceptions to the rigid time requirements which were ultimately incorporated into the 1974 amendments: 1 7 (1) in certain specified "unusual
circumstances," where the request requires compiling records from field
offices, sifting through voluminous records or consulting with another
agency, the time limits may be extended by the agency for up to ten
additional days;18 and (2) in "exceptional circumstances," where the agency in the exercise of "due diligence" is unable to comply with the time
requirements, the court in which the requesting party brings suit to force
compliance' 9 may allow the agency additional time.2 0 The question confronting courts in 1976 was whether a flood of FOIA requests, which often
delayed responses and in some cases appeared to make the ten- and twentyday time limits hopelessly inadequate, would qualify as an "unusual" or
"exceptional" circumstance.
Within a span of less than a week, two District of Columbia District
Court judges considered the question and reached opposite results. In
Hayden v. United States Department of Justice,2 1 it was held that a request
by one-time antiwar activist Tom Hayden for all FBI files relating to
himself, which the Bureau said would take four years to process, presented
an "unusual" circumstance, but not an "exceptional" one that would
permit an indefinite time extension. In Cleaver v. Kelley,2 2 on the other
hand, a similar request, this time by Eldridge Cleaver and his wife for all
FBI and Justice Department files concerning themselves, when coupled with
a backlog of pending FOIA requests,was held to involve "exceptional
circumstances." While the cases are not distinguishable on their facts, since
both involved requests for massive amounts of information from the same
agency,23 they differ with respect to the focus of the courts' attention.
17. In response to the President's letter, see note 16 supra, Sen. Kennedy and Rep.

William S. Moorhead, chairman of the House conferees, wrote:
The conference adopted at its first meeting the Senate language allowing agencies an
additional ten days to respond to a request or determine an appeal in unusual
circumstances. Pursuant to your suggestion we included language from the Senate
version making clear that a court can give an agency additional time to review
requested materials in exceptional circumstances where the agency has exercised due
diligence but still could not meet the statutory deadlines.
120 CONG. REc. S17,830 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1974).

18. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(B) (West Supp. 1976).
19. If the agency fails to meet the time limits, the person making the request "shall be
deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to such request." Id. §

552(a)(6)(C). He may then bring suit in the appropriate district court to have the agency
enjoined from withholding the requested records. Id. § 552(a)(2)(B).
20. Id. § 552(a)(6)(C).
21. 413 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1976).
22. 415 F. Supp. 174 (D.D.C. 1976).
23. It was estimated in Hayden that there were 18,000 pages of information on file that
were responsive to the plaintiff's request. 413 F. Supp. at 1288. In Cleaver, it was estimated
that at least 5,800 pages on file were potentially responsive. 415 F. Supp. at 176.
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In Cleaver, the court looked to the workload the FBI faced generally in
complying with FOIA requests, the extent to which the number of requests
had risen in recent years, and the delays that had ensued,2 4 and concluded
that "the backlog with which the Agency is now faced was not predictable
or expected; indeed, it is exceptional. "25 On finding that the FBI was
exercising "due diligence" in responding to FOIA requests, the court
retained jurisdiction of the case and permitted the Bureau additional time to
26
comply.
While the Hayden court acknowledged that the FBI was faced with
"numerous other FOIA requests and court orders enforcing those requests, '"27 it dismissed this fact as a basis for an "exceptional circumstances" extension. In so doing, the court seemed to rely in part on its belief
that "in situations like the present one, where voluminous materials must be
processed, the applicable provision" is that relating to "unusual circumstances" and not "exceptional circumstances." 28 The court's conclusion that
the Hayden request fell within the 10-day-delay "unusual circumstances"
provision was obviously correct as far as it went; that portion of the statute
explicitly refers to the need to examine "a voluminous amount of separate
and distinct records.' '29 Yet this finding should in no way imply that the
same facts may not also constitute "exceptional circumstances." It is
perhaps unfortunate that both Hayden and Cleaver requested such a great
quantity of records, because this obscured the fact that there were two
distinct considerations involved: the work required to fill the particular
plaintiff's request, and the workload the agency faced generally in complying with all requests. It was this latter factor alone that formed the basis of
30
the Cleaver holding.
The conflict between the district courts was resolved in favor of the
Cleaver approach when the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit considered the question six weeks later in Open America v. Water24. According to an affidavit, the FBI processed approximately one request per working
day in 1973 and experienced no significant delays. In 1975, it averaged 53 requests per workday.
415 F. Supp. at 176.
25. Id.
26. Id. The court took favorable note of the fact that the FBI had increased its FOIA staff
from 8 to 161 in three years. See id.
27. 413 F. Supp. at 1288.
28. Id. Inexplicably, however, the court granted the FBI approximately 14 weeks from the
issuance of the order to comply, rather than ordering immediate compliance. The order, dated
May 21, 1976, provided: "That defendants shall, not later than September 1, 1976, release to
plaintiff all material responsive to his request for which defendants do not claim an exemption." Id. at 1289.
29. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1976).
30. The court noted only in passing that Cleaver's request itself required a search of
voluminous records. 415 F. Supp. at 176.
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gate Special ProsecutionForce.31 Indeed, the court went beyond Cleaver.
Its language was so broad as to suggest that the existence of "exceptional
circumstances" may be presumed, at least with regard to FBI requests. As
long as the Bureau can show that it is exercising due diligence in processing
FOIA requests, it appears that for the foreseeable future those requesting
information under the FOIA will have to resort to court action in order to
secure compliance anywhere near the statutory time limits.
In Open America, a request was made of the FBI, the Department of
Justice and the Watergate Special Prosecutor 2 for release of all files relating
to the role of then-Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray in any aspect of the
"Watergate affair." 33 In accord with the Cleaver approach, the court did
not consider the extent of the work that would be required to comply with
the specific request 34 in reaching its determination that there were "exceptional circumstances" which warranted an indefinite time extension. Instead, it looked to the Bureau's overall costs in complying with FOIA
requests. According to an FBI affidavit, FOIA compliance would cost the
Bureau nearly sixteen times more in fiscal year 1976 than it did in fiscal year
1974, the year the amendments were passed.35 When compared with a
congressional estimate that the additional cost burden generated by the 1974
amendments initially would not exceed $100,000 per year for all agencies 3 6 -about one-third the added cost to the FBI alone in 1975-this
precipitous rise was seen to constitute an "exceptional circumstance" in and
of itself. 37 Upon finding that the Bureau's "first-in, first-out" system of
processing FOIA requests and its allocation of manpower to the task satisfied the due diligence requirement, 38 the court was left with the question of
whether it could or should expedite the processing of the particular request
before it. The court declined to take action to speed up the FBI's handling of
the Open America request, but the majority of the three-judge panel stated
in dicta that "when a plaintiff can show a genuine need and reason for
31.

547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

32. The Watergate Special Prosecutor expressed an intention to justify his refusal to
comply with the request, and so was not involved in the appeal. Id. at 608 n.7.
33. Id. at 608.
34. The court did note that at least 38,000 pages of potentially responsive material on file
had been found and that review could not be completed until approximately 10 months after
receipt of the request. Id. at 612.

35. The cost for fiscal year 1974 was $160,000. In fiscal year 1975 it rose to $462,000, and it
was estimated that the cost in fiscal year 1976 would be $2,675,000. Id.
36. See H.R. REP. No. 876, supra note 9, at 10.
37. 547 F.2d at 612.
38. Actually, the Bureau's system operated on two "tracks," one for simple requests, the
other for more complex, time-consuming matters. On each track, however, requests were
processed on a "first-in, first-out" basis, with occasional cases being expedited by a court
order or upon some other showing of special need. Id. at 612-13, 613 nn.15, 16.
See note 26 supra regarding the FBI's allocation of manpower to FOIA matters.
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urgency in gaining access to Government records ahead of prior applicants
for information," the issuance of an order granting priority to the request
would be proper. 39 No particular urgency was seen in the Open America
request. 40 The majority's view was vigorously disputed by a concurring
judge4 ' and by another circuit court,4 2 both arguing instead for priority based
on diligence by the plaintiff in pursuing court remedies.
The majority's approach to the diligence question has since been
applied by the District of Columbia District Court in Mitsubishi Electric
Corp. v. Departmentof Justice.4 3 A defendant in a civil antitrust suit, unable
to secure access to Department of Justice records through discovery, sought
to have the information released under the FOIA. The request was delayed
because of the Justice Department's workload, and the FOIA plaintiff asked
the court to compel expedition of its request because of the urgency of its
need for the information. The court denied preferential treatment, finding
that the need to use the information in collateral litigation did not itself
provide sufficient urgency; it was only "a single factor to be considered in
determining whether plaintiffs have shown a genuine need for preferential
handling of their administrative appeal."44
The circumstances in which priority may be granted on the ground of
the plaintiff's "urgent need" would seem to be narrow. Nonetheless, as
Judge Leventhal pointed out in his concurrence in Open Americaa5 granting any priority on this basis is questionable. The FOIA purports not to
focus on the individual making the request; ideally, his identity and purpose
should be of no consequence to the agency involved. 46 Judicial action
39. 547 F.2d at 615-16.

40. The court operated on the assumption that the plaintiff's request was made and the
action brought as a test case. See id. at 609 n.9.

41. Judge Leventhal, concurring in the holding, suggested that diligence in pursuing judicial relief would be preferable as a standard for assigning priority to certain FOIA requests over

others: "We cannot say that diligent litigation is without significance as a rough indicator of
priority. A priority continually unfolding on that basis is reasonable enough and does not
conflict with the FOIA provision that an applicant is not required to show 'need' to be entitled

to relief." Id. at 620.
42. In Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1976), in which Judith Campbell Exner,

self-described paramour of President John F.Kennedy, sought release of all FBI files concerning herself, the court cited with approval Judge Leventhal's concurring opinion in Open
America, see note 41 supra, and stated:
We hold the "first in-first out" consideration of demands, based on date of filing with
the FBI, ordinarily seems reasonable, and we hold that the filing of suit by a person
demanding information can (but does not uiecessarily) move such petitioner "up the
line," i.e., create a preference, particularly if a Federal Court orders it.
542 F.2d at 1123.
43. 39 AD. L.2D 1133 (D.D.C. 1976).

44. Id. at 1141.
45. See note 41 supra.
46. See notes 83-84 infra and accompanying text.
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granting priority on the basis of need thus contravenes a basic premise of the
statute. The priority method proposed in the concurrence-a determination
based on plaintiff's diligence-would not seem to be subject to this criticism. In addition, the FOIA relies largely on litigation for its enforcement if
an agency chooses to withhold information. If the result of such litigation
were to force new agencies to respond immediately only to the FOIA
requests of plaintiffs who convince the courts of their "genuine need" while
permitting them to leave all other requests behind a huge backlog, interested
parties might often choose not to litigate and many agency abuses therefore
would go uncorrected.
The priority question aside, Open America represents a broad judicial
capitulation to the budgetary exigencies of processing FOIA requests. At
least for the immediate future, a showing by an agency, similar to that made
by the FBI, that FOIA requests and the cost of processing them have
increased substantially may be all that is required for an effective suspension
of the statute's time requirements. Regardless of which method of assigning
priority to claims is used, the nature of the FOIA thus could be fundamentally altered. Securing disclosure of information from agencies ultimately may
become a court-administered function. It seems clear that for the short term,
however, the Open America solution is the only realistic one available; the
agencies operate with a finite number of dollars and employees that can
reasonably be assigned to implementing the FOIA. That this is only a
short-term solution, though, must be emphasized. As Judge Leventhal's
Open America concurrence noted, whether in the future an agency will be
able to invoke the "exceptional circumstances" provision because of workload pressures ought to depend on whether it has used "due diligence" in
taking steps to deal with the problem.4 7 But because the problem has just
recently surfaced and because the effects of the 1974 amendments are only
now beginning to be felt, it remains to be seen how short the "short term"
will be. Whether effective steps can be taken will depend on whether the
number of FOIA requests, or at least the rate of their increase, stabilizes,
and how fast the agencies are able to react.
B.

Policy Delays

Related to the problem of workload delays dealt with in Open America
is the question of whether an agency may delay the release of records for
47. Judge Leventhal wrote:
An effective demonstration of due diligence might . . . depend on whether the
agency has applied for additional funds to meet the unexpected upsurge in requests,

whether it has been or is now willing to allow partial release of documents rather than
conditioning release on complete processing of the request, and whether it has or will
defer considering any voluntary actions of disclosure which are plainly outside the
scope of FOIA, in the interest of expediting disclosure of material expressly covered
by the Act.

547 F.2d at 618 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
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policy reasons when it does not claim that the records are exempt from
disclosure under the FOIA. Two cases decided in 1976, Aviation Consumer
49
Action Project v. CAB 48 and Merrill v. FederalOpen Market Committee,
held that it may not.
At issue here is not whether the agencies have complied with the tenand twenty-day limits for responding to FOIA requests, but rather whether
the "affirmative disclosure" provisions of the Act have been met. The
FOIA provides that each agency must "currently publish" in the Federal
Register certain specified statements of general organization, procedure and
policy. 50 It must make available for public inspection all final opinions in
the adjudication of cases, statements of policy not published in the Federal
Register, and staff manuals that affect the public, unless they are "promptly
published" and offered for sale. 51 And it must make "promptly available"5 2
to any person requesting them all other records not otherwise exempted.
Because the statute nowhere defines the terms "currently" or "promptly,"
a problem arose concerning whether the presence of those words precluded
short, justifiable delays in disclosure.
Aviation Consumer Action Project (ACAP) concerned an FOIA request for a copy of a Civil Aeronautics Board decision relating to the
certification of air carriers. The relevant statute provides that such decisions
are subject to review by the President and may not be published until they
are submitted to him. 53 By Executive Order, 54 the President required the
CAB to delay disclosure of decisions for five days after they were submitted
to him in order to allow time for a determination of whether they were to be
classified. 55 The CAB in turn promulgated a regulation complying with the
Executive Order and going one step further: it provided that all affected
decisions would be made public "as promptly as possible but no later than
48. 418 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1976).
49. 413 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1976).

50. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1970).
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(2) (West Supp. 1976).
Id. § 552(a)(3).
49 U.S.C. § 1461(a) (1970).
Exec. Order No. 11,920, 41 Fed. Reg. 23,665 (1976).
Such decisions may be classified pursuant to Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. § 339

(1974).
The delay in disclosure of the decisions which the Executive Order would necessitate was

seen to be justified by 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970),.which provides that "any person" may object to
the disclosure of CAB decisions, and that the CAB will withhold the decision if it finds that "a

disclosure of such information would adversely affect the interests of such person and is not
required in the interest of the public." Although the President had not invoked section 1504 as a
basis for the Executive Order, the ACAP court found that he could have, and "[ilt would be

purposeless to require both the President and the Board to re-promulgate for cosmetic purposes
actions which clearly have a basis in law ...

" 418 F. Supp. at 637.
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the tenth working day following submission of such decision to the President."56 The regulation envisioned that the release of the decisions would be
delayed so as to permit the President to make his determination and the CAB
"thereafter to print and process its decision for publication." 57 By this, the
CAB meant that it would "print sufficient copies of its decision so that it
may be distributed simultaneously to all persons interested in the decision. '"58 The justification for this distribution plan was to minimize the
possibility that "those who become aware of the decision before others
'through fortuity or sophistication' will be given unfair advantage over
others in the stock or other financial markets."s9
In determining whether this regulation complied with the FOIA's
requirement that requested records be made "promptly available,' ' 6 the
court construed the statute quite strictly:
The FOIA specifically states that a requested record not otherwise
exempt shall be made promptly available "to any person"; it does not
state that a requestor need wait until the agency determines that enough
copies are available to satisfy all prospective requestors beside himself.
Nor does it state that a record is not releasable until it has been printed
6
and processed for publication on a mass distribution basis. '
While the records would not have to be made available immediately after the
President's determination, the court held that they could not be withheld for
the purpose of a large-scale printing. The court suggested that to comply
with the "promptly available" language of the FOIA, the CAB should make
the records available "for public inspection and copying at a public place
within a reasonable time necessary to prepare a releasable copy" and that
requestors be referred to that copy "until the decision is printed and
processed for publication on a mass distribution basis.' 62
In Merrill, a Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) regulation
provided that the release of domestic policy directives relating to the operation of the Federal Reserve banks and other materials was to be delayed for
56. 41 Fed. Reg. 28,946 (1976) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. § 339.101(b)).
57. 41 Fed. Reg. at 28,946-47.
58. 418 F. Supp. at 638.
59. Id.
60. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(3) (West Supp. 1976).
61. 418 F. Supp. at 638. The court also dismissed the argument that the 10-day delay was
justified by 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1976), which permits 10 days for a
determination of whether to comply with an FOIA request. In this litigation, it was found that
decisions made pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970), see note 53 supra and accompanying text,
are not exempt from the FOA. Therefore, the court concluded that no time was required for
such a determination. The only issue was whether the delay required by the regulation violated
the statute's command to make records "promptly available." 418 F. Supp. at 637-37.
62. 418 F. Supp. at 639.
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forty-five days after their adoption. 63 Despite the FOMC's justifications for
the delay, which involved a desire to reduce the possibility of disruptions to
monetary and securities markets that could be caused by premature disclosure, 64 the court found that if the material-was not otherwise exempt from
the FOIA, the forty-five-day delay was unwarranted:
The Court is not unmindful of the repeated insistence by the [FOMC]
. . . that such disclosure would be injurious to its function and the
nation's monetary and economic status. But the Freedom of Information Act requires prompt disclosure of non-exempt materials. . . .If it
is necessary for the FOMC to carry out its monetary policy in secrecy
then that determination must be made by Congress and not by this
65
Court.
It is clear that the ACAP and Merrill holdings are correct. They are in
line with the legislative intent that the affirmative disclosure provisions of
the FOIA be read broadly and that all official information which would
otherwise be "shielded unnecessarily" be disclosed. 66 Moreover, the holdings comport with the view of the Supreme Court that the FOIA's enumerated exemptions 67 are the exclusive means of withholding information under
the Act. 6 8 Indeed, it would be difficult to justify a contrary holding in either
case. It may be, however, that in addition to the force of their specific
holdings, these cases have a broader significance. They stand in sharp
contrast to the Open America situation, in which the time requirements for
disclosure effectively yielded to workload demands. 69 Thus, they may serve
as a counterbalance to Open America, helping to maintain the integrity of
the FOIA's purpose of prompt disclosure in the face of powerful economic
and administrative pressures. 70
I.

PRIVATE FILES EXEMPTION

One of the nine specific exemptions from disclosure contained in the
FOIA, Exemption 6, provides that "personnel and medical files and similar
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy" need not be released. 7 1 This exemption was the focus
63.

12 C.F.R. § 271.5 (1976). The time period had been reduced from 90 to 45 days in

March, 1975. See 40 Fed. Reg. 13,204 (1975).
64.
65.
66.
67.

12 C.F.R. § 271.5(b) (1976).
413 F. Supp. at 506.
S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1965).
5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (West Supp. 1976).

68. See, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973),
69. See notes 31-47 supra and accompanying text.

70. See H.R. REP. No. 876, supra note 9, at 6.
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970).
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of the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Department of Air Force v.

Rose. 72 In grappling with the language of the exemption, the Court was
faced with the problems of how to determine whether the release of information would constitute an invasion of privacy, and whether such a showing
need be made for personnel and medical files or only for files "similar" to
them.
Lower courts interpreting Exemption 6 had reached conflicting deci-

sions as to whether it required the privacy interests of affected individuals to
be balanced against the interest in disclosure, or whether the degree of the
invasion of personal privacy would be measured according to an absolute
standard, without regard to the desirability of disclosure. 73 Furthermore, if

there was to be a balancing test, the question arose whether the factor to be
weighed against privacy should be the need of the individual making the
request for the information or the interest of the public generally in having
access to the information. 74 In Rose, the Supreme Court answered the
former question definitively, holding that a balancing test indeed would be

applied. However, the Court's treatment of the issues raised by the latter
question provides no clear guidance for resolution of the matter in subse-

quent litigations.
Rose involved an FOIA request by several law review editors for
copies of case summaries of honor and ethics code hearings at the United
75
States Air Force Academy. After the request was denied by the Academy,
suit was brought under the FOIA for disclosure. 76 A five-member majority
of the Supreme Court held that the case summaries were "similar" to
personnel files, and thus fell within the scope of the exemption. Neverthe72. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
73. In Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971), a balancing test was applied:
"Exemption (6) requires a court reviewing the matter de novo to balance the right of privacy of
affected individuals against the right of the public to be informed." Id. at 674. On the other
hand, in Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 848 (4th Cir. 1973), the court held that "the right to
disclosure under the Act is not to be resolved by a balancing of equities or a weighing of need or
even benefit. The only ground for denial of disclosure in this situation is that the disclosure
would represent a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.' " See FOJA Developments-1974, at 445-49.
74. See FOIA Developments-1974, at 448.
75. In addition to relying on Exemption 6, the Academy also based its refusal on Exemption 2, relating to "internal personnel rules and practices." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1970). The
Rose Court's treatment of Exemption 2 is discussed in text accompanying notes 90-106 infra.
76. The District Court for the Southern District of New York, in an unreported decision,
granted a motion for summary judgment by the Air Force Academy, holding that although the
case summaries did not fall within Exemption 6, they were covered by Exemption 2. See
Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. at 355-57. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the summaries did not fall within Exemption 2, but it remanded the case
to the district court for in camera inspection of the case summaries to determine whether
Exemption 6 would apply. Rose v. Department of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1974).
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less, the Court remanded the case with an order that the files were to be
77
released if the district court, after in camera review of the summaries,
determined that it was possible to edit the files so as to eliminate identifying
references and protect the privacy interests of the affected cadets. In the
majority's view, a "workable compromise" would have to be struck "between individual rights 'and the preservation of public rights to Government
information.' "78
Thus, a balancing test was employed by the Court. 7 9 But it is not at all
clear what was being balanced against the cadets' right to privacy. The
language the Court used- "public rights to Government information" 8 0implies that what was being assessed was the general desirability of public
disclosure of the information, rather than the merits of the use to which the
particular plaintiff proposed to put the material. Such an interpretation
would comport with that applied by the lower court.8 1 However, the point
was not developed by the Court and it was called into question by the
dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger. Without distinguishing or challenging the language of the majority, the Chief Justice argued that the
potential for injury to innocent cadets resulting from disclosure of the
summaries, when balanced against the interest of the individualplaintiffs in
the case, necessitated a finding that release of the reports would constitute a
"clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy":
[A]ny. . . attempt to "sanitize" these summaries would still leave the
very distinct possibility that the individual would still be identifiable
and thereby injured . . . . [I]t is indeed difficult to attribute to Congress a willingness to subject an individual citizen to the risk of possible
severe damage to his reputation simply to permit law students to invade
82
individual privacy to prepare a law journal article.
In view of the language of the FOIA, which provides that non-exempt
requested materials must be made available "to any person," 83 and its
legislative history, which indicates that disclosure must be made without
regard to the particular need for the information of the person making the
request, 81 it would appear that any direct emphasis on the plaintiff's purpose
77. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1976).
78. 425 U.S. at 381 (quoting the court of appeals decision, 495 F.2d 261,269 (2d Cir. 1974)).

79. See Campbell v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 539 F.2d 58, 61-62 (10th Cir.
1976) ("The Supreme Court's decision [in Rose].

.

. express[ed] a policy which favored

disclosure and also it carefully balanced the competing interests").
80. 425 U.S. at 381.
81. See Rose v. Department of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 270 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 425 U.S.

352 (1976).
82. 425 U.S. at 384 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
83.

5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(3) (West Supp. 1976).

84. "In place of the negative approach of the present law (5 U.S.C. § 1002) which permits
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in making the request, such as was proposed in the Chief Justice's dissent,
would be improper. This is not to say, however, that the plaintiff's purpose
cannot legitimately play a role in a court's balancing of privacy interests
against interests of disclosure in Exemption 6 cases. Surely a court's
perception of the depth of a particular plaintiff's need for the information is
one element to be considered in determining the level of public interest to be
served by disclosure. While there may be cases in which there is a strong
public need for the materials sought while the individual plaintiff's purpose
in securing them is frivolous, in many other cases the plaintiff's need may
serve as a rough indicator of the public's need.
The second problem dealt with by the Rose Court in interpreting
Exemption 6 involved a grammatical construction of the statute. The exemption refers to "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.''85 It is obvious from this language that "similar" files are only
exempted if their disclosure would invade personal privacy. The question is
whether personnel and medical files are similarly subject to this qualification or whether the second "and" in the provision was meant to separate
two independent clauses, so that personnel and medical files are to be
exempted without qualification.
The issue was raised only in dictum in Rose because of the Court's
finding that the case summaries were "similar" to personnel files.
Nevertheless, the Court considered the question at length. Its reading of the
legislative history of the FOIA, which did not distinguish among personnel,
86
medical and other files in discussing the element of invasion of privacy,
and its interpretation of the congressional attitude evinced by the 1974
amendments, which provided means for courts to evaluate the impact of
only persons properly and directly concerned to have access to official records if the records

are not held confidential for good cause found, .

.

. [the FOIA] establishes the basic principle

of a public records law by making the records available to any person." H.R. REP. No. 1497,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966).
85. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970).

86. The Court read the House report ("The limitation of a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy' provides a proper balance between the protection of an individual's right of
privacy and the preservation of the public's right to Government information by excluding

those kinds of files the disclosure of which might harm the individual"), H.R. REP. No. 1497,
supra note 84, at 11, and the Senate report ("At the same time that a broad philosophy of

'freedom of information' is enacted into law, it is necessary to protect certain equally important
rights of privacy with respect to certain information in Government files, such as medical and
personnel records"), S. REP. No. 813, supra note 66, at 9, as implying that "Congress did not
itself strike the balance as to 'personnel files' and confine the courts to striking the balance only

as to 'similar files.' To the contrary, Congress enunciated a single policy to be enforced in both
cases by the courts, 'that will involve a balancing' of the private and public interests." 425 U.S.
at 373.
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disclosure of specific records without relying on "labels," 8 7 led the majority to conclude that no blanket exemption was intended for personnel and
medical files. 88 Although Justice Blackmun, in dissent, objected to this
interpretation, 8 9 the strength of the majority's language, albeit in dictum,
would indicate that this question as to the interpretation of Exemption 6 is
now largely resolved.
I.

PERSONNEL RULES EXEMPTION

In addition to considering whether Exemption 6 applied to the case
90
summaries of the Air Force Academy's honor and ethics code hearings,
the Supreme Court in Department of Air Force v. Rose 9' was also faced
with the contention that the summaries fell within Exemption 2, relating to
"internal personnel rules and practices." 92 The Court rejected this contention, resolving what formerly had been a point of controversy among lower
courts. 93 It construed Exemption 2 narrowly, distinguishing between trivial
and substantive records, and concluding that except where disclosure of the
records would lead to circumvention of agency rules,94 the exemption
covered only "matter in which the public could not reasonably be expected
95
to have an interest."The uncertainty as to the proper interpretation of the exemption was
caused by a conflict between the Senate and House reports on the statute. In
its brief treatment of the exemption, the Senate report gave examples of
areas where it would apply: ". . . use of parking facilities or regulation of
lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick leave, and the like." 96 The
House report provided examples reflecting a far broader range for the
87. The Court cited the addition in 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (West Supp. 1976) of a provision
requiring that any "segregable portion" of a record be released after all exempt portions are
deleted, and the provision in 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1976) requiring that, after

de novo review, the district court is to determine whether the records "or any part thereof"
shall be withheld, as evidence of a congressional intent that agencies and courts look "beneath

the label on a file" to determine whether it is to be exempt. 425 U.S. at 374.
88. This is contrary to the conclusion reached by at least one circuit. Robles v. EPA, 484

F.2d 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1973).
89. In finding that the qualifying phrase should apply only to "similar files," Justice
Blackmun relied on Robles, see notes 73 & 88 supra, his reading of the language of the statute
("The exemption as to personnel files and as to medical files is clear and unembellished." 425
U.S. at 387 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)), and his belief that no qualification ought to be attached
to the exemption of medical files (". . . almost the essence of ultimate privacy." Id.).
90. See notes 71-89 supra and accompanying text.

91. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
92. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1970).

93. See Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1972, supra note 2,
at 187-89.
94.

See notes 105-106 infra and accompanying text.

95. 425 U.S. at 369-70.
96.

S. REP. No. 813, supra note 66, at 8.
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exemption: "operating rules, guidelines, and manuals of procedure for
97
Government investigators or examiners."
Early decisions applying the exemption generally considered the Sen98
ate report to be the more correct expression of the congressional purpose.

This interpretation received support in the 1975 decision of the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Vaughn v. Rosen. 99 After a lengthy
discussion of the two reports, the Vaughn court adopted the narrow Senate
construction, holding that reports compiled by the Civil Service Commission evaluating the performance of the agencies' supervisors were not
exempt from disclosure under Exemption 2 because they did not pertain to
"house-keeping" matters. 100 Vaughn's formulation of the exemption, delineating "between minor or trivial matters and those more substantial
matters which might be the subject of legitimate public interest," 1 01 was

supported by three considerations: first, an indication that Congress was
dissatisfied with a corresponding provision in the disclosure statute that
preceded the FOIA, which was as broad and as vague as the House
interpretation would make Exemption 2;102 second, the rule of construction
that the FOIA exemptions are to be read narrowly;10 3 and third, the fact that
the Senate report, but not the House report, was before both houses of
Congress prior to their votes on the FOIA. 104
The Supreme Court in Rose adopted all of these rationales, and added a
fourth that seems likely to result in the creation of a separate class of
Exemption 2 cases. The Court noted that the cases adopting the broad House
97. H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 84, at 10.
98. See Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699, 702-03 (5th Cir. 1973); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d
787, 796-97 (6th Cir. 1972); Stern v. Richardson, 367 F. Supp. 1316, 1320 (D.D.C. 1973); Stokes
v. Hodgson, 347 F. Supp. 1371, 1373-75 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590,
593-95 (W.D. Wash. 1968), aff'd on othergrounds, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969). See also K.
DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 3A.17 (1972) ("The view of the Senate committee is in
accord with the statutory words"). Cf. Cuneo v. Laird, 338 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
99. 523 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
100. Id. at 1143. The Vaughn court also held that the reports were not exempt under
Exemption 5, relating to "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters," 5 U.S.C. §
552(b) (5) (1970). For a thorough discussion of Vaughn's application of this exemption and of
the exemption generally, see FOIA Developments-1975,at 382-95.
101. 523 F.2d at 1142.
102. Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964), exempted "any
matter relating solely to the internal management of an agency. .

. ."

The Vaughn court noted

that in discussing Exemption 2 to the FOIA, the chairman of the House subcommittee considering the bill said that it would replace the old statute with "workable standards. . . [containing]
specific definitions of information which may be withheld." 112 CONG. REc. 13,642 (1966). It
was the court's view that only the Senate interpretation would provide "certainty, consistency
and clarity." 523 F.2d at 1142.
103. 523 F.2d at 1142 (citing Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
104. 523 F.2d at 1142; see Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1971);Soucie
v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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interpretation had done so "only where necessary to prevent circumvention
of agency regulations that might result from disclosure to the subjects of
regulation of the procedural manuals and guidelines used by the agency in
discharging its regulatory functions." 10 5 In Rose, of course, no such danger
existed. Knowledge of the case summaries would not aid in avoiding
regulations, but rather would result in greater adherence to them by the
cadets. Accordingly, the Court specifically excluded from its discussion of
Exemption 2 those cases in which the disclosure of records could aid in the
circumvention of regulations. 106 Although the breadth of the exemption in
such situations will have to be determined in the future, Rose clearly
indicates that under certain circumstances Exemption 2 will not be limited to
"house-keeping" matters.
IV.

INVESTIGATORY RECORDS EXEMPTION

Of the two exemptions extensively amended in 1974,107 only Exemption 7, which excludes from disclosure certain investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes,108 received judicial scrutiny in 1976.

As amended, the exemption covers six specified sub-classes of investigatory
records.'0 9 Two of those have been the subject of significant interpretation:
7(A), covering records the disclosure of which would "interfere with
enforcement proceedings"; 110 and 7(D), covering records acquired from
111
confidential sources.

A.

Interference with Enforcement Proceedings.

The question that has arisen in the interpretation and application of
Exemption 7(A) concerns the extent to which specific harm to an enforcement proceeding must be shown in order to justify nondisclosure. The forum
for the debate has been National Labor Relations Board unfair labor practice
105. 425 U.S. at 364; see Tietze v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 610 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Cuneo v.
Laird, 338 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd on othergrounds sub nom. Cuneo v. Schlesinger,
484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973); City of Concord v. Ambrose, 333 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
106. 425 U.S. at 369 ("In sum, we think that, at least where the situation is not one where
disclosure may risk circumvention of agency regulation, Exemption 2 is not applicable to
matters subject to such a genuine and. significant public interest").
107. In addition to Exemption 7, Exemption 1, relating to classified documents, was
amended. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1) (West Supp. 1976).
108.
109.

Id. § 552(b)(7).
Coverage is limited to those investigatory records the disclosure of which would:

(A) interfere with enforcement procdedings,
(B) impede a fair trial,
(C) invade personal privacy,

(D) disclose a confidential source,
(E)disclose investigative techniques, or
(F) endanger enforcement personnel.
Id.
110.
Ill.

Id. § 552(b)(7)(A).
Id. §552(b)(7)(D).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1977:532

proceedings. The NLRB's restrictive pretrial discovery procedures permit
the taking of depositions only on a showing of "good cause" and not just as
a means of aiding counsel;' 12 additionally, the release of a witness' affidavit
as a matter of right is allowed only after the witness has testified on the
subject of the affidavit. 113 Despite a statement by the Supreme Court that
"[d]iscovery for litigation purposes is not an expressly indicated purpose"
of the FOIA, 114 litigants before the NLRB have attempted to use the Act to
fill the gaps created by the Board's restrictive discovery rules. 115 The
NLRB, in turn, has invoked Exemption 7(A) as a defense.
There existed a split of authority among early decisions applying
Exemption 7(A): some held that specific harm to enforcement proceedings
would have to be shown in each case; 116 others held that records compiled
for use in pending NLRB proceedings were per se nondisclosable and that
no specific harm need be shown. 117 But with the 1976 decision of the
Second Circuit in Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 118 a consensus seems to
119
have emerged in support of the latter position.
112. 29 C.F.R. § 102.30(1976); see NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854, 858
. . has construed [§ 102.301. . . as requiring more than a showing
that the taking of depositions would aid counsel in the preparation of his case for trial."
"Good cause" ordinarily involves a showing that "there is reason to believe that the
witness whose deposition is sought may be unavailable at the hearing." Id. at 857.
113. 29 C.F.R. § 102.118(b)(1) (1976).
114. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974). See also NLRB
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1974). This, of course, does not imply that
discovery is an illicit purpose for invoking the FOIA. It simply does not give the plaintiff a
preferential status.
115. For this procedure to be effective, in most cases the district court hearing the FOIA
case would have to have the power to enjoin the NLRB proceedings from continuing while the
FOIA request was pending. Whether such power exists has been the subject of debate. See
discussion at notes 162-90 infra and accompanying text.
116. See Goodfriend Western Corp. v. Fuchs, 411 F. Supp. 454 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 535 F.2d
145 (1st Cir. 1976); Maremont Corp. v. NLRB, 38 AD. L.2D 1010 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Cessna
Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 405 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Kan. 1975), rev'd, 542 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1976).
117. See Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F. Supp. 971 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. NLRB, 38 AD. L.2D 276 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 407
F. Supp. 208 (D. Colo. 1975), aff'd, 539 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1976). See generally FOIA Developments-1975, at 399-408.
118. 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976).
119. In addition to the line of cases that had been in accord with the Title Guaranteedecision
previously, see note 117 supra, at least three courts of appeals and six district courts have cited
the Title Guarantee opinion with approval and have joined in its interpretation of Exemption
7(A). See Cessna Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 542 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1976); Roger J. Au & Son, Inc.
v: NLRB, 538 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1976); Goodfriend Western Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145 (1st
Cir. 1976); IT Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, 40 AD. L.2D 183 (D.D.C. 1976); Chrysler Corp.
v. NLRB, 39 AD. L.2D 132 (E.D. Mich. 1976); E.L. Rice & Co. v. Nash, 39 AD. L.2D 141 (E.D.
Mich. 1976); Pacific Photo Type v. NLRB, 39 AD. L.2D 43 (D. Haw. 1976); Marathon LeTourneau Co. v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 1074 (S.D. Miss. 1976); Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.
Supp. 698 (N.D. Ill. 1976); NLRB v. Biophysics Systems, Inc., 39 AD. L.2D 704 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
(2d Cir. 1970): "The Board.
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In Title Guarantee, the NLRB had taken written statements and affidavits from witnesses pursuant to a complaint against the company alleging unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act. 120
The company requested copies of the witnesses' statements under the FOIA,
but the request was denied.121 Finding that "the specific enforcement
proceeding would not be harmed" by disclosure, the district court determined that Exemption 7(A) was inapplicable, ordered disclosure and enjoined the NLRB proceeding until the order was complied with.' 2 2 On
appeal, the Second Circuit reversed. The appellate court found that "if
statements obtained by the NLRB from employees, or their representatives,
in connection with unfair labor practice proceedings against an employer
were required to be disclosed, interference with the proceedings could well
result" in two ways. First, the employer could use the information to
"frustrate the proceedings or construct defenses" which would inhibit the
prosecution. Second, affiants and deponents "who are interviewed may be
reluctant, for fear of employer displeasure, to have it known that they have
given information. . . , or union officials might not want to volunteer
information for fear of compromising the union's position in negotiations." ' 123 For these reasons, the court concluded that "statements of employees, and their representatives, obtained in connection with unfair labor
practice enforcement proceedings, are not subject to disclosure as a result of
Exemption 7(A)."' 24 In such cases, no specific harm-either to the proproceeding for which the information was gathered or to subsequent
125
ceedings-would have to be proven; the harm is presumed.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), (5) (1970).
534 F.2d at 486.
407 F. Supp. 498, 505-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
534 F.2d at 491.
Id. at 492.

125. One dispute that has emerged among the courts attempting to apply Title Guarantee's
holding is over the issue of whether statements supplied to the NLRB by affiants who are

already scheduled to testify (and which will thus become available to opposing litigants in the
course of the proceedings, see 29 C.F. R. § 102.118(b)(1) (1976)) are covered by Exemption

7(A). In Robbin's Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 39 AD. L.2D 248 (N.D. Ala. 1976), the court
held that they were not. It was the court's finding that the "Board has not demonstrated how
the delivery several days prior to the scheduled hearing of routine statements or affidavits will
interfere with enforcement proceedings of the Board." Id. at 252. However, in identical
circumstances, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Goodfriend Western Corp. v.
Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1976), correctly interpreted the language of the Title Guarantee
opinion and found that it was not distinguishable:
While it may well be that the circumstances minimize the possible interference
with the pending proceedings, the present order is nonetheless controlled by the
reasoning in Title Guarantee. Even in this case we cannot rule out all possibility that

the company may 'be able to use disclosure to learn the Board's case in advance and
frustrate the proceedings.'
Id. at 147.
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The Title Guaranteecourt expressly limited its holding to NLRB cases
where the materials sought were compiled for use in an investigation that
was still pending at the time the FOIA request was made. 126 It was necessarily limited to NLRB cases because the motivating force behind the court's
interpretation of the statute was its conclusion that the FOIA was not
intended to alter the "carefully arrived at limitations and procedures for
discovery in unfair labor practice proceedings."127 It may indeed be, as the
court found, that a contrary holding, one in accord with the lower court's
restrictive reading of Exemption 7(A), 128 would change the nature of NLRB
discovery practices. But in protecting the traditional discovery procedures,
the court in Title Guarantee appears to have compromised its fidelity to the
legislative history of the exemption. While the court admitted that the
plaintiff's argument in support of the district court's holding was "not
without force,"' 12 9 and that it was "almost persuaded" by the plaintiff's
reasoning, 130 the court found the legislative history of the exemption to be
unclear. 131 In debate on the amendment, however, its sponsor, Senator
Philip A. Hart, had sought to clarify the circumstances under which Exemption 7(A) could be invoked:
This would apply wherever the Government's case in court-a
concrete prospective law enforcement proceeding-would be harmed
by the premature release of evidence or information not in the possession of known or potential defendants. This would apply also where the
agency could show that the disclosure of the information would substantially harm such proceedings by impeding any necessary investigation before the proceeding. In determining whether or not the information to be released will interfere with a law enforcement proceeding it is
only relevant to make such determination in the context of the particular enforcement proceeding.3 2
126. "We feel it unnecessary to make the broad determination that any investigative
information obtained in connection with a pending enforcement proceeding is per se nondisclosable. . . . [e do not intend our comments to apply broadly to administrative contexts
other than unfair labor practice enforcement proceedings before the NLRB." 534 F.2d at
491-92. See also Amerace Corp. v. NLRB, 39 AD. L.2D 566 (W.D. Tenn. 1976) (disclosure of
documents used at unfair labor practice hearing after hearing has taken place).
127. 534 F.2d. at 492. The Second Circuit added:
We cannot envisage that Congress intended to overrule the line of cases dealing

with labor board discovery in pending enforcement proceedings by virtue of a
back-door amendment to the FOIA when it could very easily have done so by direct
amendment to Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b),

or by a blanket enactment pertaining to discovery in pending administrative enforcement proceedings.
Id. at 491-92. See notes 112-113 supra and accompanying text.
128. See text accompanying note 122 supra.
129. 534 F.2d at 491.
130. Id. at 492.

131.

Id. at 491.

132.

120 CONG. REC. S9330 (daily ed. May 30, 1974).
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Surely this explanation suggests that Congress envisioned that use of
Exemption 7(A) would require some demonstration of specific harm to an
enforcement proceeding. Moreover, as one commentator has pointed out,
there are two further problems with the Title Guarantee result. 133 First, the
Supreme Court has read the 1974, amendments to Exemption 7 as indicating
"that Congress disapproves of those cases . . . which relieve the Government of the obligation to show that the disclosure of a particular investigatory file would contravene the purposes of Exemption 7. '"134 Second, the
Act specifically provides that the district courts, upon complaint by an FOIA
plaintiff, "shall determine the matter de novo,. . . and the burden is on the
agency to sustain its action" under the exemptions. 135 Both of these factors
militate against giving conclusive effect to an NLRB determination that
records compiled for pending proceedings are within Exemption 7(A).
Furthermore, the rule of cohstruction enunciated by the Supreme Court, that
the exemptions to the FOIA are to be interpreted narrowly, 136 would seem to
mandate a result contrary to the Title Guarantee holding.
It remains to be seen whether the Title Guarantee interpretation of
Exemption 7(A) will find applicability in contexts other than NLRB proceedings.1 37 It is of course possible that it will. But without the peculiar
justification provided by the NLRB discovery rules, which the Title
Guarantee court acknowledged was strong enough to overcome a reasonably compelling argument to the contrary, 1 38 it would appear that such an
interpretation would be in error.
B.

Confidential Sources

The second facet of the investigatory records exemption to be given
significant judicial attention in 1976-Exemption 7(D), protecting the identity of confidential sources 139 -appears to be receiving a very narrow read133. FOIA Developments-1975, at 406.
134. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 164 (1975).
Before 1974, Exemption 7 covered "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement
purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency." 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(7) (1970). In limiting the exemption's scope to the six specified sub-classes of investiga-

tory files, the 1974 amendments sought to "clarify Congressional intent disapproving of certain
court interpretations which have tended to expand the scope of agency authority to withhold"
information under Exemption 7. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974); S.
CONF.REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974).
135. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1976).
136. Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
137. A similarly liberal reading was applied in one pre-Title Guarantee non-NLRB case.

Exemption 7(A) was held to be applicable in a Federal Trade Commission case because

"[i]f

citizens believed that government agencies would disclose their names upon their complaining

about possible violations of law, it would have a chilling effect on the government's enforcement activities." Amway Corp. v. FTC, 38 AD.L.2D 1015, 1019 (D.D.C. 1976).
138. See text accompanying notes 129-30 supra..
139. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(D) (West Supp. 1976).
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ing. Unlike Exemption 7(A), which arguably has been extended in scope
beyond that suggested by its legislative history, Exemption 7(D) has been
construed so as to restrict its applicability and adhere to the FOIA's "general philosophy of full agency disclosure." 140 Two questions have arisen in its
interpretation. It has been asked, first, whether the content of the records as
well as the identity of the informer may be withheld, and second, whether
the identity of the informer may be withheld if, in the future, his name
would be disclosed anyway. The first question is very nearly answered by
the bare language of the statute.
The exemption consists of two clauses: the first speaks generally of
protecting only the identity of confidential sources; the second provides that
for criminal or national security intelligence investigations, both the identity
41
of the confidential source and the information supplied may be withheld. 1
The one court to have considered the question in 1976 has held that the
special reference to criminal and national security cases in the second clause
implies that all other cases are controlled by the first clause alone. 142 This is
literal
clearly the correct result. Not only is it strongly suggested by the
43
terms of the statute, but it is compelled by its legislative history.
It should be noted, however, that there is one basis on which the
information supplied by a confidential source in a proceeding controlled by
the more general first clause may be withheld. If the identifying matter
cannot be segregated from the contents so as to protect fully the identity of
the informer, the entire record will be exempted. 144 If the superficial and
deferential treatment accorded this precept in the single 1976 decision
140. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 66, at 3.
141. This section does not apply to matters that are.

. .

investigatory records com-

piled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such
records would.

. .

disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a

record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal
investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence

investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source.
5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(D) (West Supp. 1976).
142. Furr's Cafeteria, Inc. v. NLRB, 416 F. Supp. 629, 631 (N.D., Tex. 1976).

143. In its discussion of the exemption, the conference report on the amendments noted:
In every case where the investigatory records sought were compiled for law enforce-

ment purposes-either civil or criminal in nature-the agency can withhold the
names, addresses, and other information that would reveal the identity of a confiden-

tial source who furnished the information. However, where the records are compiled
by a criminal law enforcement authority, all of the information furnished only by a
confidential source may be withheld if the information was compiled in the course of
a criminal investigation .

. .

. Personnel, regulatory, and civil enforcement investi-

gations are covered by the first clause authorizing withholding of information that

would reveal the identity of a confidential source but are not encompassed by the

second clause authorizing withholding of all confidential information under the
specific circumstances.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1380, supra note 134, at 13; S. CONF. REP. No. 1200, supra note 134, at 13.
144. See Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 39 AD. L.2D 244, 248 (W.D. Tenn. 1976).
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applying it145 provides any reliable indication, the rule may potentially play
a larger role in Exemption 7(D) cases.
The answer to the second question-whether the FOIA will protect the
confidentiality of an informer's identity if it will be disclosed at a later
date-appears to be negative. The three courts which have considered the
matter are in agreement. 146 Where all of the records contain information
from confidential sources who are scheduled to testify in open proceedings
and whose identities will be disclosed when they testify, Exemption 7(D)
does not apply:
Weighing their interest in retaining their confidential status for a limited
period of time against the FOIA's public policy of disclosure, we find
no basis to consider such persons confidential sources within the meaning of Exemption 7(D), except for those persons whom the [agency]
will stipulate that it will not call as witnesses.1 47
There is no legislative history directly authorizing this holding. But it is
clear that the result is in accord with the Supreme Court's rule that exemptions to the FOIA are to be construed narrowly so as to promote the fullest
disclosure possible. 148
V.

STATUTORY EXEMPTION

Exemption 3, which as originally enacted covered records "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute," 149 was amended in 1976 so as to
greatly restrict its applicability.150 The amendment qualified Exemption 3 by
providing that for a statute to affect the FOIA's disclosure requirements, it
must possess one of two characteristics. Either it must require "that the
matters be withheld in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue,"
or it must establish "particular criteria for withholding" or refer "to
particular types of matters to be withheld. ' 5 1 In so limiting Exemption 3,
145. The court wrote simply: "We further conclude that the statements are of such a nature
that there are no segregable portions which can be provided to [the FOIA plaintiff] without
disclosing the identity of the persons giving the statements." Id.
146. Marathon LeTourneau Co. v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 1074 (S.D. Miss. 1976); Mylan
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Climax Molybdenum Co.
v. NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 208 (D. Colo. 1975), affl'd, 539 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1976).
147. Marathon LeTourneau Co. v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 1074, 1084 (S.D. Miss. 1976).
148. See, e.g., Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).

149. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970).
150. The amendment was enacted as part of the Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L.
No. 94-409, § 5, 90 Stat. 1241, 1247-48, (1976) (to be codified in 5 U.S.C. § 552b). See generally
Note, The Government in the Sunshine Act-An Overview, 1977 DUKE L.J. 565.
151. Government in the Sunshine Act, § 5(b), Pub. L. No. 94-409, §5(b), 90 Stat. 1241, 1247
(1976). The language of the amended Exemption 3 conforms to a corresponding exemption to
the Sunshine Act's requirement of open government meetings. Id. § 3(a)(c)(3) (to be codified in
5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(3)). See Note, supra note 150, at 576.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1977:532

the amendment overruled a far more liberal interpretation of the exemption
52
by the Supreme Court in FAA Administrator v. Robertson. 1
The plaintiffs in Robertson had requested reports compiled by the FAA
containing analyses of the operation and maintenance performance of commercial airlines.1 53 Refusing to comply with the request, the FAA invoked
Exemption 3, relying on section 1504 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
which gives the FAA Administrator and Board the power to withhold such
reports "when, in their judgment, a disclosure of such information would
adversely affect the interests of [any party objecting to disclosure]. . . and
is not required in the interest of the public."' 154 The Court found that this
statute qualified under Exemption 3. In so holding, it rejected a lower court
determination15 5 that because the statute conferred on the FAA broad discretionary power to prevent disclosure, it could not be considered a
"specific exemption."1 56 The Court read the legislative history of the FOIA
as implying that Congress did not intend to distinguish between statutes that
exempted specified materials from disclosure and those that delegated the
57
power to withhold materials to the agencies. 1
The amendment makes clear that Congress did indeed intend to make
that distinction. The House report on the amendment specifically noted that
Robertson would be overruled and that the statute which Robertson construed, "which affords the FAA Administrator carte blanche to withhold
any information he pleases," would not fall within Exemption 3 as
amended.151 The report cited several tightly drawn prohibitions against the
disclosure of specified records as examples of statutes which would fall
59
within the exemption. 1
152.
153.
154.
155.

422 U.S. 255 (1975); see FOIA Developments-1975, at 395-98.
422 U.S. at 257.
49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970).
Robertson v. Butterfield, 498 F.2d 1031, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974); accord, Schecter v.

Weinberger, 506 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Stretch v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1974);
Cutler v. CAB, 375 F. Supp. 722 (D.D.C. 1974); See FOIA Developments-1975, at 395.
156. 422 U.S. at 261.

157. Id. at 263-67. Specifically, the Court referred to the remarks of Senator Long, discussing S.i666, a predecessor of the FOIA: "It should be made clear that this bill in no way limits
statutes specifically written with the congressional intent of curtailing the flow of information
as a supplement necessary to the proper functioning of certain agencies." Hearings on S. 1666

Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practiceand Procedureof the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1963).
158. H.R. REP. No. 880 (pt. 1), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1976). The House report cited the

Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970), as another example of a statute which does not fall
within Exemption 3. See notes 217-25 infra and accompanying text.
159. The report referred to the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2161-2166 (1970), which

provides for the nondisclosure of restricted data concerning nuclear energy; the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1970), which prohibits the disclosure of information
gathered by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in an investigation pursuant to a
complaint; the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 437g(a)(3) (West Supp. 1975),
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In limiting the application of Exemption 3 to cases in which a statute
specifically identifies the records it protects, Congress has reaffirmed its
intention to allow agencies to withhold only that information which the
Government has a demonstrated need to keep in confidence. It has erased
the danger that Exemption 3, if broadly construed, could effectively place
unlimited discretion in the hands of agencies with respect to the release of a
significant proportion of their records. 160 And it has made clear when the
FOIA refers to information specifically exempted from disclosure by statute, it truly means exempted by statute, and not by an agency's ad hoc
determination that the information ought not to be released.161
VI.

POWER TO ENJOIN ONGOING AGENCY PROCEEDINGS

As a general rule, it is agreed that courts considering FOIA requests
possess the jurisdiction to enjoin agency proceedings pending disposition of
the FOIA claim. 162 One question that has provoked sharp disagreement
among courts in 1976, however, is whether the proceedings of the NLRB
constitute an exception to this rule. As was discussed above with respect to
Exemption 7(A), 163 because the NLRB has promulgated restrictive discovery rules, litigants before that agency have sought to use the FOIA as a
substitute means of gaining access to information not otherwise available to
them. For such a tactic to be effective, it is essential that the records be
disclosed prior to the litigation for which they were sougl~t. An FOIA
request may not be enforced by a court pursuant only to a discovery
subpoena; a separate FOIA request must be filed, and a de novo hearing
must be held. 164 Thus, in many cases, in order for the release of information
which prohibits the disclosure of information compiled during an investigation by the Federal

Election Commission; and the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970), which prohibits
the disclosure of decisions of the FAA affecting the certification of air carriers until the

decision is submitted to the President. H.R. REP. No. 880 (pt.1), supra note 158, at 23.
160.
161.
respect
U.S.C.

See FOIA.Developments-1975, at 398.
This point was raised in 1966 by Professor Kenneth C. Davis, when he noted that with
to the applicability of Exemption 3 to a provision of the Securities Exchange Act, 15
§ 78x (1970), which gives the SEC unlimited discretion to withhold records except

"when in its judgment a disclosure of such information is in the public interest," a "respectable

argument may be made that the information is exempted by the Commission and not by the

statute." Davis, The Information Act: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 34 U. Cal. L. REV. 761, 787
(1966).
162. See FOIA Developments-1974, at 417-24; FOIA Developments-1975, at 367-70.
163. See notes 112-138 supra and •accompanying text.
164. See Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Lampe, 421 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Ill. 1976). There, a litigant in

a securities fraud civil action sought discovery of FBI records in a related criminal fraud case.
Confronted with Department of Justice regulations giving the Attorney General discretion to

refuse to comply with such discovery subpoenas, 28 C.F.R. § 16.21-26 (1976), the plaintiff
sought to substitute the FOIA as the basis of his request. The court refused to entertain the
request when made by such a procedure. Citing the danger that FOIA requests made without
the formality of FOIA complaints would not give agencies adequate notice upon which to
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to be of use to a litigant, a temporary injunction against the agency proceedings would be required.
The District of Columbia Circuit and the Sixth Circuit Courts of
Appeals are the centers of the two conflicting views. By coincidence, the
controlling cases in both circuits are entitled Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
NLRB. For the sake of clarity and convenience here, the District of
Columbia case will be referred to as Sears (D.C. Cir.), 165 and the Sixth
166
Circuit case will be called Sears (6th Cir.).
The Sears (D.C. Cir.) court held simply that the federal courts have
"jurisdiction to enjoin agency proceedings pending resolution of a Freedom
of Information Act claim."1 67 No exception was made for NLRB proceedings. The holding was founded on the District of Columbia court's 1972
opinion in Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Board,168 which
noted that while the FOIA nowhere confers injunctive power on the district
courts, 16 9 there is similarly no indication of a congressional intention to
withhold "the tools necessary for courts to implement" the substantive
goals of the statute. 170 The court found that Congress, by its failure to
withhold injunctive power, had implicitly sanctioned the courts' "inherent
authority to preserve the status quo pending a judicial review of the
merits."'171 Furthermore, the court read the legislative history of the FOIA
as indicating that at least one purpose of the Act was to aid litigants in
172
pursuing their cases before agencies.
After the Sears (D.C. Cir.) decision, the same court's decision in
Bannercraft was reviewed by the Supreme Court, and its treatment of the
prepare their responses and the possibility that litigants would be given an unfair advantage
over nonlitigating FOIA plaintffs, the court held that "a separate complaint [must] be filed
under FOIA before a federal court obtains jurisdiction to enjoin a withholding of official
information." 421 F. Supp. at 349.
165. 473 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 950 (1974).

166. 433 F.2d 210 (6th Cir. 1970).
167. 473 F.2d at 93. There must, of course, be the usual showing of irreparable harm,
inadequacy of legal remedies, and probability of prevailing on the merits before the court will
interpose the equitable remedy. Id.
168. 466 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd, 415 U.S. 1 (1974). For adiscussion of the Supreme
Court's reversal of the decision in RenegotiationBoard, see notes 173-75 infra and accompanying text. See also FOIA Developments-1974, at 418-27.
169. 466 F.2d at 351-52.

170. Id. at 354.
171.

Id. at 353 (citing Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942)).

172. 466 F.2d at 352. The Senate Report on the FOTA stated that the provision later codified
as 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1970) (amended, but not altered in any way relevant to this discussion,
by the Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974)), requiring agencies to
publish an index of their opinions and orders, "will prevent a citizen from losing a controversy

with an agency because of some obscure and hidden order or opinion which the agency knows
about but which has been unavailable to the citizen because he has no way in which to discover
it." S. REP. No. 813, supra note 66, at 3.
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injunctive power of FOIA courts was reversed with respect to the proceedings of the Renegotiation Board. 173 The basis for the Court's holding was
that the nature of the negotiation process requires that it be conducted
without judicial intervention. 174 The opinion was limited to renegotiation
cases, and the question of "whether or under what circumstances, it would
be proper for the District Court to exercise jurisdiction to enjoin action
pending the resolution of an asserted FOIA claim" was expressly left
open. 175 Despite the Court's refusal to address the jurisdictional question in
the abstract, one of the 1976 cases holding that FOIA courts possess the
power to enjoin NLRB proceedings was based directly on the Supreme
Court's Bannercraft opinion; 176 another was based on Sears (D.C. Cir.)
77
and cited Bannercraft.1
But as has been pointed out in the recent cases applying the Sears (6th.
Cir.) rule that district courts do "not have the power to enjoin or review
decisions" of the NLRB,178 Bannercraftprovides rather weak authority for
upholding the existence of such power in NLRB cases. Sears (6th Cir.) was
based on a finding that the statutorily mandated procedure for review of
NLRB cases (placing jurisdiction in the courts of appeals) 179 was exclusive,
and that injunctive relief by district courts in FOIA cases would interfere
with such later judicial review. 180 Bannercraft, of course, in no way
173. 415 U.S. 1, 20 (1974). The Renegotiation Board is empowered by 50 U.S.C. §§ 12111233 (1970) to conduct informal negotiations with United States defense contractors for the
purpose of eliminating "excessive profits."
174. See 415 U.S. at 22: "Nothing new by way of due process emerged with the FOIA.
Nothing therein indicates that Congress wished to change the Renegotiation Act's purposeful
design of negotiation without interruption for judicial review."
175. Id. at 20.
176. Saint Elizabeth's Hosp. v. NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 1357, 1358 (N.D. Ill. 1976), cites
Bannercraft as authority for a holding that the court "clearly has jurisdiction" to enjoin an
NLRB proceeding pending disposition of an FOIA request.
177. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 39 AD. L.2D 265 (D. Kan. 1976). Other 1976 cases
holding that there is injunctive power either so held without supplying authority, see Barnes &
Noble Bookstores, Inc. v. NLRB, 38 AD. L.2D 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Goodfriend Western
Corp. v. Fuchs, 411 F. Supp. 454 (D. Mass.), rev'd on othergrounds, 535 F.2d 145 (Ist Cir.
1976), or assumed so without supplying authority and proceeded to discuss the merits of issuing
an injunction in the particular case, see Abrahamson Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. NLRB, 38 AD.
L.2D 1095 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1976), like Bannercraft, left open the question of whether there is injunctive power. It did not have to reach the
question, as the court found that the absence of irreparable injury warranted denial of the
injunction on general equitable grounds. Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 412 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ill.
1976), correctly cited Bannercraft as leaving open the question of the court's power to issue an
injunction. Inexplicably, however, the court found support for the existence of the power in 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1970), which confers power on the district courts to enjoin the wrongful
withholding of non-exempt records.
178. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 433 F.2d 210, 211 (6th Cir. 1970).
179. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970).
180. 433 F.2d at 211. One court, following Sears (6th Cir.), objected to this as a justification,
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addressed this issue, and courts have noted that it did not undermine the
81
validity of Sears (6th Cir.).
Additional support for the proposition that there is no power of injunction in FOIA cases concerning the NLRB has been found by analogizing to
the Supreme Court's treatment of renegotiation cases. In Bannercraft, the
nature of the negotiation process-the "give and take," the "stress upon
and use of the strengths of one's own position and the weaknesses of the
position of the other party"-was seen to necessitate an immunity from
interim judicial interference. 8 2 "[Wlere it otherwise, the effect would be
that renegotiation, and its aims, would be supplanted and defeated by an
FOIA suit.' ' 1 83 One court has argued that the NLRB's function of settling
and adjudicating labor disputes is subject to a similar risk of interference by
FOIA suits. 14
The arguments of Sears (D.C. Cir.) and its progeny, permitting FOIA
courts to enjoin NLRB proceedings, and those of Sears (6th Cir.) and the
cases following it, refusing to permit the exercise of such power, seem to
leave no middle ground. The conflict boils down to a choice between what
one court perceived as the legislative intent behind the statute 8 5 and what
the other viewed as the exclusivity of a statutory mode of review. 186 But one
more factor should be added to the dispute. As justification for refusing to
permit injunctions against NLRB proceedings, at least two courts following
Sears (6th Cir.) have noted the danger that, if such injunctions were
allowed, the FOIA could be used as a tool of discovery. 187 Dicta from the
188
Supreme Court indicate that this is not a favored purpose of the FOIA.
pointing out that section 160(f) review, see nofe 179 supra, is limited to a determination of

whether there was substantial evidence to support the Board's findings of fact. "This scarcely
amounts to a full appellate review to an aggrieved employer akin to the ordinary appeal
procedures." NLRB v. Hardeman Garment Corp., 38 AD. L.2D 631, 633 (W.D. Tenn. 1976).
181.
Inc. v.
182.
183.

See Amerace Corp. v. NLRB, 38 AD.L.2D 1093 (W.D. Tenn. 1975); Chassen Bakers,
NLRB, 38 AD. L.2D 1096 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1974).
Id. at 20.

184. Southwest Motor Freight, Inc. v. NLRB, 411 F. Supp. 1019 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). The
court did not spell out the parallel it perceived between renegotiation and labor cases, but
apparently it was concerned with a lack of resources or commitment to litigation on the part of
NLRB adversaries. The court referred to the danger that "the delay and expense incident to a
suit for injunctive relief under FOIA could defeat the purposes of the National Labor Relations
Act." Id. at 1021.
185.

See notes 167-72 supra and accompanying text.

186. See notes 178-80 supra and accompanying text.
187. See Amerace Corp. v. NLRB, 38 AD. L.2D 1093, 1094-95 (W.D. Tenn. 1975); Chassen
Bakers, Inc. v. NLRB, 38 AD. L.2D 1096, 1097-98 (M.D. Pa. 1975).

188. In Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974), the Court wrote:
"Interference with the agency proceeding opens the way to the use of the FOIA as a tool of
discovery. . . .Discovery for litigation purposes is not an expressly indicated purpose of the
Act." Id. at 24.
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More importantly, however, as discussed above, the courts dealing with the
applicability of Exemption 7(A) to NLRB cases have found that the problems that might be encountered if the FOIA could be used to usurp and
extend the function of the limited NLRB discovery procedures were sufficient to compel the conclusion that all investigatory records compiled for
pending NLRB litigation fall within the exemption. 189 This conclusion was
reached despite reasonably compelling arguments in favor of a contrary
interpretation. 190 There does not seem to be any reason why the dangers of
using the FOIA as a broad discovery tool should be any less of a factor in
dealing with the court's equitable power than in the context of the applicability of Exemption 7(A). If greater attention is given to the issue in this
context, the balance could well be tipped in favor of Sears (6th Cir.) and
against the power of FOIA courts to issue injunctions in NLRB cases.

VII.

REVERSE-FOIA

CASES

Although the primary purpose of the FOIA is to "permit access to
official information" 191 and although it establishes "a general philosophy of
full agency disclosure,"' 92 that goal is not unconstrained. The Act's nine
enumerated exemptions 193 attempt to strike a "workable balance between
the right of the public to know and the need of the Government to keep
information in confidence." 19 The conflict thus recognized by the statute's
drafters has given rise to a legal dispute that they perhaps did not anticipate: 195 private parties who have submitted to agencies information or
records that arguably are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA have
attempted to prevent disclosure and to have their privacy interests protected
by courts through injunctive or declaratory relief. Such an action has come
196
to be known as a reverse-FOIA suit.
Although the prerequisites to a reverse-FOIA cause of action are by no
means settled, 197 they may be roughly sketched as follows: first, the court's
189.

See notes 126-38 supra and accompanying text.

190. Id.
191. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973). See also Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425
U.S. 352 (1976).

192. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 66, at 3.
193.

5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (West Supp. 1976).

194. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 66, at 6.
195. See Note, Reverse-Freedom of Information Act Suits; Confidential Information in
Search of Protection,70 Nw. U.L. REv. 995,996-97 (1976): "Congress intended the FOIA to be

a weapon against the propensity of Gbvernment agencies to withhold information from private
citizens. Using the FOIA to prevent disclosure probably was beyond the contemplation of the

Act's supporters."
196.

See generally Reverse-FOIA Suits; Note, supra note 195.

197. See Note, supra note 195, at 999-1000.
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jurisdiction must be established; 198 second, the material sought to be kept
199
from disclosure must be shown to fall within one of the nine exemptions;
and third, a legal basis must be established upon which the agency's
disclosure of the material would be unlawful. This last-mentioned requirement has been a primary point of controversy. It has been noted that the
requirement can be met in two ways. 2°° The exemption under which the
material is withheld may be construed to be compulsory, thus making
disclosure automatically unlawful. Alternatively, the exemption may be
construed to be permissive, meaning that while an FOIA plaintiff could not
compel disclosure of the covered records, the agency would be free to
release them if it chose to do so, notwithstanding the exemption. Under the
latter interpretation, disclosure of the information would be unlawful only if
it was shown to constitute a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) as being "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law. "201
With respect to one of the exemptions-Exemption 3, covering information specifically exempted from disclosure by statute 20 2 this distinction
clearly makes no difference. Whether the exemption is construed to be
"compulsory" or "permissive," the effect is the same. This is because of
the APA's language, which proscribes agency actions "not in accordance
with law. '203 Any statute falling within Exemption 3 serves two purposes:
198. At least three separate theories of jurisdiction have been offered, see Reverse-FOIA
Suits at 347-59:
(1) under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970); see Charles River

Park "A," Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Rumsfeld, 70
F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Ohio 1976);

(2) under a specific statute requiring nondisclosure; see Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United
States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967);

(3) on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), "arising under the . . . laws" of the United
States; see Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1214 (4th Cir. 1976).
199. Obviously, if the FOIA does not exempt the materials from disclosure, it compels their
disclosure, and there would therefore be no basis upon which to seek a protective order. See
United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 39 AD. L.2D 694, 696 (D.D.C. 1976).

It should be emphasized that reverse-FOIA suits are different from cases in which the
agency seeks to withhold information not exempt from disclosure under the Act. Apparently,

such an act by an agency is impermissible. "The majority of the courts which have considered
the matter

. . .

have declined to find equitable discretion to refuse to compel disclosure of

non-exempt information." FOIA Developments-1975, at 370; see Fruehauf Corp. v. IRS, 522
F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1975).
200. See Reverse-FOIA Suits at 333-39.
201. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970); see Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Rumsfeld, 70 F.R.D. 595
(N.D. Ohio 1976). The elements necessary to prove a violation of §706(2)(A) are discussed in

Reverse-FOIA Suits at 339-47.
202. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(3) (West Supp. 1976), as amended by the Government in the

Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409 § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1241, 1247 (1976). See notes 149-161 supra and
accompanying text.
203.

See text accompanying note 201 supra.
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under the FOIA, it exempts the information from mandatory disclosure, and
under the APA, it prohibits the agency from disclosing the information.
Thus, even if Exemption 3 is construed to be "permissive," it is in effect
"compulsory," because the same statute that exempts the information from
disclosure also takes away the agency's discretion to release it. 204 Although
there has been a lively debate in recent years as to whether the "permissive"
or "compulsory" approach is correct, 20 5 developments in 1976 have shown
that this distinction may be without significance with respect to one other
exemption, Exemption 4, relating to trade secrets and confidential commer20 6
cial and financial information.
The argument in favor of an overall "permissive" approach is plain on
the face of the general provisions of the statute. In subsection (a), the FOIA
provides for the general disclosure of records and sets out the means of
enforcing the disclosure provisions. 20 7 In subsection (b), it provides that the
Act "does not apply to matters" that fall within the exemptions.2"s This has
been read to imply that "the FOIA is neutral with respect to exempt
information; it neither authorizes or [sic] prohibits the disclosure of such
information. "209 This was the approach taken by the Fifth Circuit in 1976 in
Pennzoil Co. v. FPC.2 11 Under Pennzoil, a reverse-FOIA plaintiff is required to show that disclosure of the information claimed to be exempt
21 1
under Exemption 4 would be an abuse of the agency's discretion.
204. See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1198-99 (4th Cir. 1976);
Reverse-FOIA Suits at 340-43.

205.

See Reverse-FOIA Suits at 333-39.

206. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970).

207. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (West Supp. 1976).
208.

Id. § 552(b).

209. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
210.
211.

534 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 630-32. A similar result was reached by the Ninth Circuit in Union Oil Co. v.

FPC, 542 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976). The holding in Union Oil came on a rehearing in which the
court retracted an earlier determination that Exemption 4 prescribed compulsory nondisclo-

sure, characterizing that earlier finding as "premature." Id. at 1045-46.
Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit in Pennzoil called for the use of what one commentator, see

Note, supra note 195, at 1011, has described as an "indirect" application of the FOIA in
determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion:

FOIA is not irrelevant in determining whether information encompassed in its exclusions should be disclosed. In reviewing the agency's exercise of discretion concerning the release of such information, this court must be cognizant of the fact that
Congress in drafting a broad disclosure statute found sufficient justification for
withholding this type of information from public perusal.
534 F.2d at 630.
In Pennzoil, the Fifth Circuit appears to have shifted from an interpretation that the FOIA
exemptions warrant compulsory nondisclosure to its present position that they are permissive

only. In Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 519 F.2d 31 (5th Cit. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976), a suit attacking an FPC order which directed natural gas companies to disclose sales
information, the court upheld a cause of action by the affected oil companies founded on
Exemption 4 of the FOIA. In rejecting an FPC argument that the exemptions were permissive
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One of the strongest statements of the contrary "compulsory" position
2 12
is found in the 1974 case of WestinghouseElectric Corp. v. Schlesinger,
which was reviewed by the Fourth Circuit in 1976.213 The plaintiffs in
Westinghouse had supplied to the Department of Defense confidential
reports which contained information on employment patterns, pay scales,
promotions and seniority pursuant to an Executive Order requiring such
information of government contractors. When third parties sought access to
the reports under the FOIA, the plaintiffs brought suit to block their
2 14
release.
The district court enjoined disclosure of the information, interpreting
Exemption 4 as a mandate for compulsory nondisclosure which left no
discretion in the agency. 215 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the holding, but in
so doing, it ignored the lower court's interpretation of Exemption 4 as a
compulsory provision, resting its decision instead on a permissive reading of
the statute. 216 When the appellate court's reasoning is viewed in light of
developments subsequent to the decision, it becomes clear that its "permissive" interpretation of Exemption 4 nonetheless may be "compulsory" in
effect.
The Fourth Circuit found that the material sought was protected by the
Trade Secrets Act, which makes it a crime for a government employee to
disclose confidential financial information "to any extent not authorized by
law.' '217 This statute was seen by the court to trigger Exemption 3, thereby
removing both the agency's duty to release the records and its discretion to
do so.2 18 Under Exemption 3, of course, the "compulsory"/"permissive"
and not compulsory, the court ordered that any disclosure of the sales information be limited so
as to protect the identity of the particular companies supplying it. Although this was a limited
application of the "compulsory"

approach, it did acknowledge the existence of a cause of

action based directly on an exemption, without regard to the agency's discretion.
212.
213.
214.
215.

392 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1974).
542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1196.
The court wrote:

The defendants argue that the FOIA is authority only for disclosing information, not
withholding it, and consequently cannot be used as a vehicle to prevent disclosure;

that the exemptions are permissive only, being categories of information which may
be exempt by an agency; and that this is a matter largely committed to agency

discretion. The Court rejects this argument. It makes the statutory exemption meaningless and flies in the face of the protective purpose of the exemption as enunciated
in the Senate and House Reports.
392 F. Supp. at 1250 (emphasis in original); see Reverse-FOIA Suits at 334-35.
216. 542 F.2d at 1197-1203.
217. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970).
218. 542 F.2d at 1197-1203; see notes 201-04 supra and accompanying text. The district

court also considered this as a possible basis for its holding ("18 U.S.C. § 1905 .. .also
supports the relief requested by plaintiffs." 392 F. Supp. at 1250) but based its holding instead

on its "compulsory" interpretation of Exemption 4. See note 215 supra and accompanying
text.
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distinction is functionally irrelevant.2 19
After the Westinghouse appeal was decided, however, Exemption 3
was amended, as discussed above. 220 The Trade Secrets Act no longer falls
within its scope. 22 1 The Act may still form a basis for a reverse-FOIA
action, but the suit must now be grounded on Exemption 4 rather than
Exemption 3.
The House report on the amendment to Exemption 3 pointed out that
although the Trade Secrets Act did not fall within the exemption, if information qualified under some other exemption to the FOIA, the Trade Secrets
Act might then operate to remove the agency's discretion to release the
information. 222 The Act prohibits the disclosure of confidential financial
information "to any extent not authorized by law. '"223 Obviously, if the
information is not exempt from disclosure under the FOIA, then the FOIA
itself furnishes authorization for its disclosure and the Trade Secrets Act
cannot apply. However, if the information falls within one of the FOIA
exemptions, there is no such affirmative authorization. Unless some other
statute requires that the information be disclosed, the Trade Secrets Act will
squarely apply, making the agency's disclosure of the information an abuse
224
of discretion.
In cases such as Westinghouse, then, where the information sought is
covered by both Exemption 4 and the Trade Secrets Act, the effect will be
the same whether the exemption is construed to be "compulsory" or
"permissive." If "compulsory," the exemption itself will impose a duty of
nondisclosure; if "permissive," the exemption will remove the agency's
duty to disclose the information, and the Trade Secrets Act will foreclose its
discretion to do so. Several courts have stated that the Trade Secrets Act is
generally coterminous in scope with Exemption 4.225 Although the precise
extent of the overlap between the Trade Secrets Act and Exemption 4 must
be determined in individual cases, the effect of the Act-at least with
respect to some of the information covered by Exemption 4-is to make
nondisclosure under the exemption compulsory.
219. See notes 202-05 supra and accompanying text.
220. See notes 149-62 supra and accompanying text.
221. The legislative history of the amendment explicitly referred to the Trade Secrets Act as
an example of a statute that would not fall within Exemption 3 as amended. H.R. REP. No. 880

(pt. 1), supra note 158, at 23.
222. Id. See note 201 supra and accompanying text.
223. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970).
224. See note 201 supra and accompanying text.
225. See Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 580 n.5 (D.C.

Cir. 1970) ("[Tlhis type of information [information covered by the Trade Secrets Act] is
already protected from disclosure under the Act by §552(b)(4)"); Ditlow v. Volpe, 362 F. Supp.
1321, 1324 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on othergrounds, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (The Trade

Secrets Act "is co-extensive with Exemption 4"). See also Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Ass'n v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 444, 446 (D.D.C. 1975).
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CONCLUSION

Judicial and legislative developments in 1976 have left unanswered as
many existing questions concerning the FOIA as they have resolved, and
they have raised many new questions as well. Several issues, such as
whether FOIA courts possess jurisdiction to enjoin NLRB proceedings and
whether the exemptions to the FOIA require compulsory nondisclosure, are
still the subjects of substantially divided authority. An amendment to the
FOIA's statutory exemption has given the courts a new topic for interpretation. Some questions, such as whether delays in disclosure for workload or
policy reasons will be tolerated and how confidential investigatory records
will be treated, were the subjects of significant judicial attention in 1976 for
the first time. In other areas, such as the treatment of investigatory files
compiled for pending NLRB proceedings, a consensus appears to have
emerged from a former diversity of opinion, but the question remains
whether it will continue. Finally, in those areas where the Supreme Court
has spoken authoritatively, as in the interpretation of the personal files and
personnel rules exemptions, it has yet to be seen whether the Court's
treatment will meet with congressional approval and whether it will be
implemented effectively by the lower courts. It appears certain that because
of the frequency of litigation involving the FOIA, all of these questions will
be before courts in the near future. And because of the complex balancing of
interests involved in any FOIA decision, new questions will emerge as
quickly as present problems are resolved.

